Conservatism-Liberalism-Socialism Essays - Political Ideologies

Conservatism-Liberalism-Socialism Conservatism, liberalism and socialism can be called ideologies, as they constitute ?comprehensive set of beliefs and attitudes about social and economic institutions and processes? (Lawson, 44). These three ideologies, which have been developed throughout history, share both similarities and differences. Conservatism, unlike liberalism, generally opposes radical changes in social and economic domain. As the word connoted, the accumulated knowledge of the past and its application to political and economic functions is better to be conserved. Almost all representatives of the theory of conservatism placed great emphasis on the wisdom of generations, which naturally led to the formation of traditional values and customs. Any social experiment by government was perceived as a threat for the tradition of the nation which was the main factor contributing to the preservation of social stability and, consequently, of national development. Change was to be accepted only if it occurred at a gradual and consistent pace. The view of human nature according to conservatism is not egalitarian, in the sense that some people, placed in society, are more capable than others to contribute to its development and they are the ones to be placed in positions of authority. Individuals must guide their behav ior according to traditional moral standards, set by functional institutions, such as Church. For example, ?the increasing political power of the Catholic Church, as well as of other religious groups in the U.S., suggests an area where institutional bases for traditional conservatism may be evolving? (handout, 11). Conservatism evokes strong feelings of patriotism, since support for the established institutions are greatly promoted and each person serves his/her country with consistency and loyalty. This patriotism leads to an increased trust to in the military forces in cases of external threat, rather than in diplomacy. The liberal, now, view of human nature is highly egalitarian and can be strongly contrasted with that of the conservative, since it suggests an elevated perspective of human beings and diminishes the importance of the social unit. Human rights and liberties constitute a political necessity. Political systems must contribute to individual happiness and their role must be restricted. In a liberal society, the individual is a rational being and, according to classical economists, rationality is expressed in a materialistic way. That is the rational allocation of energy in an effort to maximize profit. This is the economic man in a liberal society. The political man is the one who makes critical choices when participating in democratic procedures. Liberalism has many times been identified with democracy and the ideal government should be pluralistic and not paternalistic. The essential principle of liberalism is individual freedom, which must be expanded and served in all levels of life, political and economic. Another ideology that marked the historical stream of thought is socialism. Socialism is a highly egalitarian ideology, which, unlike liberalism, stresses on individual's natural sociability that entails great decrease of cooperation among human beings and not aggressive competition. Unfortunately, socialists claim that human exploitation by other humans has its roots to established structures of control and this is also the reason for the existence of poverty. Thus, socialism, in contrast with conservatism, is critical to the existing structures and institutions and promotes change. The preferred mean of effective change is revolution. In a socialist regime, the role of the government is to ensure fair distribution of wealth and to render the means of production communal, by means of enlarging the public domain. If the land and the factories are owned by the state, and the workers control the state, everybody will share the same opportunities and economic quality, socialism's most i mportant value will be achieved. Poverty will be extinct in this way and the claim of many socialists, that their ideology emerged out of conserve for solving poverty problems, will be verified. Although, the differences to be found among these three ideologies are numerous, there are some similarities between liberalism and conservatism, which via the approach of the ideology of laissez-fair conservatism, or else classical liberalism, combined their forces to face the danger of socialism-communism.

A Brief History of the Black Panther Party Essays - Free Essays

A Brief History of the Black Panther Party Essays - Free Essays A Brief History of the Black Panther Party A Brief History of the Black Panther Party The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was founded in October, 1966, in Oakland, California by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale. The name was shortened to the Black Panther Party (BPP) and it began spreading eastward through the Black urban ghetto-colonies across country. In the summer of '68, David Brothers established a BPP branch in Brooklyn, New York, and a few months later Lumumba Shakur set up a branch in Harlem, New York. i joined the Harlem BPP in the fall of '68 and served as its Finance Officer until arrested on April 2, 1969 in the Panther 21 Conspiracy case which was the opening shot in the government's nationwide attack on the BPP. Moving westward, Police Departments in each city made military raids on BPP offices or homes in Philadelphia, Chicago, Newark, Omaha, Denver, New Haven, San Diego, Los Angeles, and other cities, murdering some Panthers and arresting others. After i and most other Panther 21 members were held in jail and on trial for two years, We were all acquitted of all charges and released. Most of us returned to the community and to the BPP but by then COINTELPRO had taken its toll. The BPP was rife with dissension, both internal and external. The internal strife, division, intrigue, and paranoia had become so ingrained that eventually most members drifted or were driven, away. Some continued the struggle on other fronts and some basically cooled out altogether. The BPP limped on for several more years, then died what seemed a natural death. History will be the ultimate judge of the BPP's place in the Black Liberation Movement (BLM). But in these troubled times Afrikan people in the U.S. need to investigate both the positive and negative aspects of the BPP's history in order to learn from those hard lessons already paid for in blood. In particular We need to learn the reasons for the BPP's rapid rise to prominence, the reason for its ability to move so many Afrikans and other nationalities, and the reason for its demise during its brief sojourn across the American scene. It's not possible in this short paper, on short notice, to provide much of what is necessary, so this paper will confine itself to pointing out some of the broader aspects of the BPP's positive and negative contributions to the BLM. The Positive Aspects of the BPP's Contributions Self-Defense: This is one of the fundamental areas in which the BPP contributed to the BLM. It's also one of the fundamental things that set the BPP apart from most previous Black organizations and which attracted members (particularly the youth), mass support, and a mass following. The concept is not only sound, it's also common sense. But it must be implemented correctly, otherwise it can prove more detrimental than beneficial. The self-defense policies of the BPP need to be analyzed in this light by present day Afrikan organizations. All history has shown that this government will bring its police and military powers to bear on any group which truly seeks to free Afikan people. Any Black "freedom" organization which ignores self-defense does so at its own peril. Revolutionary Nationalist Ideology: The BPP was a nationalist organization. Its main goal was the national liberation of Afrikan people in the U.S., and it restricted its membership to Blacks only. It was also revolutionary. The BPP theories and practices were based on socialist principles. It was anti-capitalist and struggled for a socialist revolution of U.S. society. On the national level, the BPP widely disseminated socialist base programs to the Afrikan masses. Internationally, it provided Afrikans in the U.S. with a broader understanding of our relationship to the Afrikan continent, the emerging independent Afrikan nations, Third World nations, Socialist nations, and all the Liberation Movements associated with these nations. Overall the ideology provided Afrikans here with a more concrete way of looking at and analyzing the world. Heretofore much of Black analysis of the world, and the society in which We live, was based on making ourselves acceptable to White society, proving to Whites that We were human, proving to Whites that We were ready for

Cosmetic Surgery Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Cosmetic Surgery - Essay Example Cosmetic surgery does not only improve one’s appearance but also makes a person happier and more confident since society values beautiful people. In fact, a research indicate that attractive people, both male and female, are more regarded and treated more positively( Olson and Marshuetz ,2005). They have better chances of getting hired, earning higher incomes, achieve higher marks, have better social skills and are even less prone to commit crimes ( p.502). In cases where one is not born with natural external beauty, cosmetic surgery can play a crucial role in changing the situation. The bottom line is that self confidence is a huge factor in being successful and a beautiful appearance adds to one’s confidence. With the availability of cosmetic surgery , there is now a quick and good chance to change one’s beauty and ultimately live a more confident and happier life. Pleasant looks has been linked to encouraging reactions from other people, including plain liking or passionate fondness, promotion and success in career, judgments and punishing in legal settings, and several others. Commonly, appearance is more strongly connected to assessment and consequences for women than for men. Contemporary cultures across the globe socialize women to internalize an onlooker’s perception on their physical bearing, and hence to endure more embarrassment and misery over bodies that do not match the cultural model. In reaction to this, women are more probable suffer from eating disorders in an attempt to manipulate their appearance (Davis, 2002). Thus, there is a higher incidence of eating disorders in women since they are more conscious of their physical appearance especially when looking for a mate. It is common nowadays for men and women to try several procedures for improving physical attractiveness as methods for drawing the attention, and retaining passionate partners. Some resort to extreme physical exercise or

Exam questions Article Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Exam questions - Article Example Another one is that it is a threat to social freedom. Plato’s study was already revolving around enlightenment, and according to him â€Å"Enlightenment is a Myth and Enlightenment reverts to Mythology†. The criticism more or less conveys the same meaning of critiques made by Adorno. The most powerful claim and argument placed by Mr. Robin Collingwood was â€Å"art is an attempt to achieve beauty†. According to him the physical transformation and appearance is not the beauty but the art, inner self, purity of heart, sculpture is important which defines the beauty. And the one or the thing which looks beautiful is a sublime i-e looks beautiful, inspires you but then evaporate soon. I will go with the second philosopher because Edmund Burke’s view was that sublime and the beautiful are mutually exclusive. So Collingwood’s thought was much better. Beauty is when it rests in the hearts of the people watching or experiencing it and not meant to evaporate or vanish out as the ages fall. Stories Homer and Iliad’s have marked affects on public opinions and shaping ancient Greek values. The reason why Iliad has so much admiration among the ancient’s Greek is because it is an epic poem, which means it was used to speak narrative of â€Å"elevated matters†. Plato also put forward and instruction or an alternative view of poetry as well Aristotle was steeped in Homeric tradition and clearly saw another side which Plato was failed to recognize and analyze. He construed more positively the role mimesis in art opposite of Plato and sees more positivity of homer’s stories in the shaping of Greek culture and values. Robin G. Collingwood has expressed his views in the words that the stories of Homer and Iliad have failed to empathize properly, with the historical actors or comprehend their behavior accurately in their own terms. He also said that they have failed to elucidate the past and they were only used to condemn it. The views by Aristotle were best

Death According to Socrates and Roland Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Death According to Socrates and Roland - Essay Example A majority of sixty voted to convict Socrates, and he jokingly offered to pay a fine of 100 drachmae, a fifth of his property. The prosecutor was not happy with this and pushed for the death, a penalty of which the jury agreed by a margin of 360 to 140. Although his supporters encouraged him to flee, Socrates did not and would not repent for his actions professing that he would rather die in his own manner than live like those who had condemned him. Socrates stated, "I say, gentlemen, to those who voted to kill me, that vengeance will come upon you immediately after my death, a vengeance much harder to bear than that which you took in killing me" (Plato 40). In essence, Socrates believed his death would teach others to hold fast to their convictions, even in the face of condemnation by an unjust society. The Song of Roland is touted as the oldest known major work of French literature. It is written as an epic poem depicting heroic deeds that took place in 778 A.D., when Charlemagne's retreating army was attacked by pagan armies. Roland was an army soldier, said to be a nephew of Charlemagne. The tale speaks of betrayal and revenge within Charlemagne's army, with Roland and his fellow soldier Oliver being left with only an army of twelve peers when thousands of Franks attack. Oliver pleads to Roland to retreat, however, Roland states, "Hold the field, let us not be beaten! The French say: 'A curse on the man who runs away! Until death itself not one of us will fail you'" (Merwin 35). Roland and his peers are successful in battle after a bloody fight which includes slicing off limbs. Roland eventually suffers a severe injury to his temple, not through battle but by blowing his horn at the urging of a comrade to call Charlemagne's troops. "Count Roland, in pain and anguish, and in grea t sorrow, blows a blast on his ivory horn, and the bright blood flows from his mouth, and the veins burst on his forehead, but the sound of the horn swells and mounts" (Merwin 55). Roland continues to fight, despite his injury, tries to unsuccessfully break his sword, and then "His brains have begun to seep out through his ears. He prays for the peers, asking God to summon them to His presence, and then for himself he calls upon the angel Gabriel.appearRoland is dead and God has taken his soul into heaven" (Merwin 69 & 73). It is clear that Roland fought a valiant fight and his honor and morality would not allow him to surrender even in the face of impossible odds. Therefore, Roland believed that his death would teach others to never give up on beliefs and values, even if faced with certain demise and destruction. How Does Socrates' and Roland's Beliefs Reflect the Values of Athens and Medieval Europe Socrates' beliefs do not appear to reflect the values of ancient Athens. He was not satisfied with accepting the mores of the day and questioned the influential figures of the time, whose reputations for wisdom and virtue he debunked through his questioning. Socrates also taught his students this method of inquiry, which greatly upset the established order and moral values of Athens. Socrates criticized democracy, including the local voting process, yet he also fought and argued for obedience to local

Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance

Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance CHAPTER II REVIEW OF LITERATURE Corporate governance paradigm is based on the argument of Berle and Means (1932) that separation of ownership and control leads to the problems associated with agency theory so that the managers of a company may not act in the best interest of owners. Throughout the twentieth century, the pattern of ownership continued to change from declining individual ownership to increasing institutional ownership. So, it is not surprising that institutional investors are increasingly looking more carefully at the corporate governance of companies because good governance goes hand in hand with increased transparency and accountability. Many studies have been conducted to see the impact of institutional holdings on corporate governance. Some researchers contend that substantial holdings by institutional investors and corporate governance are significantly correlated while others argue the absence of such a relationship. Evidences are also inconclusive on whether institutional investors invest in good governed companies or their holdings improve the governance practices. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. The present chapter covers the empirical studies on the above issues as institutional holdings and corporate governance, institutional holdings and firm performance, corporate governance and firm performance with special emphasis on the studies conducted in India on the above aspects. The present submission seeks to evaluate the impact of institutional holdings over corporate governance and firm performance by constructing governance score and taking various measures for firm performance. Various studies have focused on different aspects/levels of ownership and their effects on firm performance. As a result, various arguments have been put forward both in support and against the notion of the effects of ownership structure on the firm performance. While some researchers denied the direct correlation between ownership structure and firms economic performance while the others argued that there exists such a relationship for certain. Amongst those who establish such causality, some provide evidence that there is a negative relationship, while others plead a positive relationship between the two. Studies have also been carried to determine a link between varied aspects of corporate governance and firm performance; evidence in this regard too appears fairly mixed. There has been extensive literature to document a positive relationship between the two, based on identified individual aspects of corporate governance and firm performance whereas others do not find any conclusive evidence in this regard. Prepositions put forwarded by the researchers in this context are being reviewed here as under in the perspectives identified above: 2.1 Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance Coombes and Watson (2000)1 on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. Three-quarters of the investors say that board practices are at least as important as financial performance. In fact, over 80% of the investors in the survey stated that they would pay more for the shares of a well-governed firm than a poorly governed firm with comparable financial performance. The survey indicated that the premium these institutional investors would be willing to pay varied by country, with premiums being higher in Asia and Latin America (where financial reporting is less reliable) than in Europe or the U.S. Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2004)2 indicated that firms whose accounting methods conform to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles have a greater level of investment by U.S. institutional investors. They found further that increases in conformity with U.S. GAAP are positively associated with future increases in U.S. institutional investment, but that the reverse does not hold (i.e., increases in U.S. institutional ownership are not associated with later changes in accounting methods). The authors attributed this relation to home bias rather than better transparency (and corporate governance) however; their results are also consistent with the latter interpretation. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002)3 hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies or they will be able to unravel the earnings management rule so it will not benefit the managers. They found that when institutional investors own a large percentage of a firms outstanding shares, there is less opportunistic earnings management (i.e., less use of discretionary accruals). Hartzell and Starks (2003)4 provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. First, they found a positive association between institutional ownership concentration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity of a firms executive compensation. Second, they reported a negative association between institutional ownership concentration and excess salary. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003)5 indicated that those firms that fired their top executives had a significantly greater decline in institutional ownership in the year prior to the CEO turnover than firms experiencing voluntary CEO turnover (even after controlling for differences in performance). These results support the hypothesis that institutional selling influences decisions by the board of directors-increasing the likelihood a CEO is forced from office. This implies that boards care about institutional trading and ownership activity in their firms. Further, the authors found that larger decreases in institutional ownership are associated with a higher probability of an outsider being appointed to succeed the CEO. This result suggests that directors are more willing to break with the current corporate management and institute change. They also noted that there are several potential effects when institutions sell shares. First, heavy institutional selling can put downward pressure on the stock price. Alternatively, institutional selling might be interpreted as bad news, thus triggering sales by other investors and further depressing the stock price. Finally, the composition of shareholder base might change, for example, from institutional investors with a long-term focus to investors with a more myopic view. This last effect might be important to directors if the types of institutions holding the stock affect share value or the management of the company. Cremers and Nair (2005)6 stated that the interaction between shareholder activism on behalf of institutional investors and the market for corporate control is important in explaining developments in abnormal equity returns and accounting measures of profitability. Davis and Kim (2007)7 found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2008)8 have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988)9 found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to â€Å"go along† with management decisions. The rationale is that pressure-sensitive investors might have current or potential business relations with the firm that they do not want to jeopardize. Maug (1998)10 noted that institutions use their ability to influence corporate decisions are partially a function of the size of their shareholdings. If institutional investor shareholdings are high, shares are less marketable and are thus held for longer periods. In this case, there is greater incentive to monitor a firms management. However, when institutional investors hold relatively few shares in a firm, they can easily liquidate their investments if the firm performs poorly, and therefore have less incentive to monitor firm performance. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003)11 provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Marsh (1997)12 has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Denis and Denis (1994)13 found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996)14, provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite conclusions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)15 found little evidence of an association between total institutional ownership and other possible control mechanisms (e.g., insider ownership, block holders, outside directors, CEO human capital, and leverage). Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996)16 focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Leech (2002)17 is of the view that many institutional shareholders do not seek control of a company for a variety of reasons, which include the fear of obtaining price sensitive information, and that it is more likely that institutional investors seek only influence rather than complete control. Moreover, it has also been argued, in line with the â€Å"passive monitoring† view, that institutional investors may not be keen to â€Å"exit† on their investments â€Å"i.e. sell their equity stakes when the firm is not performing optimally, mainly because they hold large investments and thus selling may lower the price and further increase any potential loss. Woidtke (2002)18 concluded by comparing the relative value of firms held for public versus private pension fund that relative firm value is positively related to private pension fund ownership and negatively related to (activist) public pension fund ownership. These results supported the view that the actions of public pension fund managers might be motivated more by political or social influences than by firm performance. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007)19 examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Dahlquist et al. (2003)20 analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings and explained that firm size is driven by liquidity. It reiterated that foreigners tend to underweight the firms with a dominant owner. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003)21 asserted that the information problems cause foreigners to hold fewer assets in firms. Firm level characteristics can be expected to contribute to the information asymmetry problems. Concentrated family control makes it more likely that information is communicated via private channels. Informative insiders have incentives to hide the benefits from outside investors by providing opaque financial statements and managing earnings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004)22 found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005)23 found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Covirg et al. (2008)24 concluded that foreign fund managers have less information about the domestic stocks than the domestic fund managers. They found that ownership by foreign funds is related to size of foreign sales, index memberships and stocks with foreign listing. Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009)25 found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with â€Å"better† governance practices. This literature assumes that firm level corporate governance mechanisms substitute for weak country level legal protections of minority shareholders. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2005)26 found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger shareholder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Resume After reviewing the literature on the above sub-section, it is concluded that the results are inconclusive regarding the association between institutional holdings and corporate governance as some studies invariably support the hypothesis that institutional holdings and corporate governance are significantly related while the others reject it. But the results are uniform on one issue that there is positive relation between the foreign institutional holdings and corporate governance as foreign institutional investors are relatively more concerned about the governance practices of companies and countries as well. They prefer to invest more in the countries with stronger shareholder rights and legal frameworks. Similarly, they do invest in the companies with good disclosure and transparency measures. A group of studies contend that institutional investors consider governance practices of companies as an important consideration for investment decision. They not only care for financial performance of target companies, but also put great emphasis on the board practices. They are ready to pay premium for good governance. Institutional investors can put pressure on firms improve their governance practices if they have substantial stake in the target companies and do not have business relations with them. Moreover, if they dont involve themselves actively in governance but only vote with their feet it serves as a deterrent for the management in practicing bad governance. As it will send bad signal to the stock market leading to further decline in the stock prices and may be changing the shareholder base from dynamic institutional investors with long-term focus to myopic investors. Whereas in other studies, it has been observed that institutional investors prefer to remain passive and concentrate on their own business objectives, rather than look into the governance practices of companies. They do not involve themselves actively in the governance of firms for variety of reasons as short-term performance measurement, business relationships, regulatory environment, information processing limitations, free-rider problem etc. Moreover, they may not be interested in selling the shares of poor firms as they have large holdings and selling may aggravate their potential loss. 2.2 Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance Pound (1988)27 explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. The conflict-of-interest proposition suggests that in view of other profitable business relationships with the firm, institutional investors are coerced into voting their shares with management. The strategic-alignment hypothesis states that institutional owners and managers find it mutually advantageous to cooperate. Holderness and Sheehan (1988)28 found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988)29 further stated that the managerial ownership is positively related to performance between 0-1% of managerial ownership, negatively related thereafter up to 5%, and again positively related from 5-20% and negatively related thereafter. Boardman and Vining (1989)30 compared the performance of state owned enterprises, joint enterprises, and private corporations among the 500 largest non-US industrial firms, and found that mixed enterprises and state owned enterprises perform substantially worse than similar private enterprises. McConnell and Servaes (1990)31 found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Han and Suk (1998)32 found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. They also found that alignment effect dominates if the managers own up to 41.8% of the share capital. They further evidenced that beyond the limit of 41.8%, the mangers are able to control the Board of directors and so the entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994)33 found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Bethel et al. (1998)34 consistent with the view that market for partial corporate control identifies and rectifies problems of poor corporate performance, found that activist investors typically target poorly performing and diversified firms for block share purchases, and thereby assert disciplinary effect on target companies plans in mergers and acquisitions. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006)35 investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareholders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Bhattacharya and Graham (2007)36 investigated the relationship between different classes of institutional investors (pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant) and firm performance in Finland. It documented evidence that these institutional owners own stakes in multiple firms across industries, leading to a possible two-way causality or endogenous problem between firm performance and ownership structure. It was also evidenced that institutional investors with likely investment and business ties with firms have negative effect on firm performance and the impact is very significant in comparison to the negative effect of firm performance on institutional ownership. Wiwattanakantang (2001)37 investigated the effects of controlling shareholders on corporate performance and found that presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance, when measured by accounting measures such as return on assets and the sales-asset ratio. However, the controlling shareholders involvement in management has a negative effect on the performance and it is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder and managers ownership is at the 25-50 percent. The evidence also revealed that family controlled firms display significantly higher performance. Foreign controlled firms as well as firms with more than one controlling shareholder also have higher return on assets, relative to firms with no controlling shareholder. Abdul Wahab et al. (2007)38 examined the relationship between corporate governance structures, institutional ownership and firm performance for 440 Bursa Malaysia listed firms from 1999 to 2002 and found that institutional investors have a positive impact on firms corporate governance practices. Qiet et al. (2000)39 found that firm performance is positively related to the proportion of shares owned by the state. In addition, they found little evidence in support of a positive correlation between corporate performance and the proportion of tradable shares owned by either domestic or foreign investors. Wahal (1996)40 observed that although institutional investors, particularly, activist institutions, have been successful in their efforts to affect the governance of targeted firms, these same firms have not demonstrated performance improvements. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991)41 and Lowenstein (1991)42, for instance, find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005)43 study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1997)44 as well as Pounds (1988)45 theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990)46 suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976)47 also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)48, Duggal and Miller (1999)49 find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. Resume Various studies on relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance have been reviewed in the above sub-section and the results are mixed. Different researchers have taken different performance measures as some of them have considered accounting measures but others have taken stock market indicators.Some of the observations contend that institutional investors are more expert in monitoring the affairs of companies as compared to individual investors; their holdings improve the financial performance of target companies. The results are more significant, where managers also have some ownership stake so as to have alignment effect. Moreover, if their stake is substantial, they can also assert disciplinary action against the poorly performing firms. Similarly, foreign institutional investors have also positive impact on the firm performance. But the results of other observations state otherwise. They state that if institutional investors have business ties with the firms, they would go along with the management and it may have negative impact on the firm performance. The studies have revealed out an interesting observation that Institutional holdings have positive effect on firm performance but their active involvement in management has negative effect. Some of the observations state that institutional investors may have significant impact on the governance practices of companies but do not improve financial performance. 2.3 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance Lipton and Lorsch (1992)50 found that limiting board size improves firm performance because the benefits by larger boards of increased monitoring are outweighed by the poorer communication and decision-making of larger groups. Millstein and MacAvoy (1998)51 studied 154 large publicly traded US corporations over a five-year period and found that corporations with active and independent boards appear to have performed much better in the 1990s than those with passive, non-independent boards. Eisenberg et al. (1998)52 found negative correlation between board size and profitability when using sample of small and midsize Finnish firms, which suggests that board-size effects can exist even when there is less separation of ownership and control in these smaller firms. Vafeas (1999)53 found that the annual number of board meeting increases following share price declines and operating performance of firms improves following years of increased board meetings. This suggests meeting frequency is an important dimension of an effective board. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)54 observed that CEO compensation is lower when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. It is further shown that firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. Botosan and Plumlee (2001)55 found a material effect of expensing stock options on return on assets. They used Fortunes list of the 100 fastest growing companies and obtained the effect of expensing stock options on firms operating performance. Morgan and Poulsen (2001)56 found that pay-for-performance plan generally helps to reduce agency problems in the firm as the votes approving the plan are positively related to firms that have high investment or high growth opportunities. On the other hand, votes approving the plan are inversely related to negative features in some of the plans such as dilution of shareholder stakes. Mitton (2002)57 examined the stock performance of a sample of listed companies from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. It reported that performance is better in firms with higher accounting disclosure quality (proxied by the use of Big Six auditors) and higher outside ownership concentration. This provides firm-level evidence consistent with the view that corporate governance helps explain firm performance during a financial crisis. Claessens et al. (2002b)58 observed that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership (right to receive dividends) of the largest and controlling shareholder, consistent with â€Å"incentive† effects. But when the control rights (arising from pyramid structure, cross-holding and dual-class shares) of the controlling shareholder exceed its cash-flow rights, firm value falls, which is consistent with â€Å"entrenchment† effects. Deutsche Bank AG (2004a and 2004b)59 explored the implications of corporate governance for portfolio management and concluded that corporate governance standards are an important component of equity risk. Their analysis also showed that for South Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, the performance differential favored those companies with stronger corporate governance. Fich and Shivdasani (2004)60 based on Fortune 1000 firms, asserted that firms with director stock option plans have higher market to book ratios, higher profitability (as proxied by operating return on assets, return on sales and asset turnover), and they document a positive stock market reaction when firms announce stock option plans for their directors. Gompers et al. (2003)61 examined the ways in which shareholder rights vary across firms. They constructed a ‘Governance Index to proxy for the level of shareholder rights in approximately 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5% per year during the sample period. They found that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. Brown, Robinson and Caylor (2004)62 created a broad measure of corporate governance, Gov-Score, based on a new dataset provided by Institutional Shareholder Services. Gov-Score is a composite meas

Barbara Ehrenreichs Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America E

Barbara Ehrenreich's Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America Barbara Ehrenreich is a political/social journalist and writer. She is a best-selling author with a dozen book credits to her name. Her works include Blood Rites, The Worst Years of Our Lives, and Fear of Falling. She also has written articles for Time, Harpers, The New Republic, The Nation, and The New York Time Magazine. Her Ph.D. in biology endows her with the experience and discipline to approach as a scientific experiment the study resulting in her newest book, Nickel and Dimed. Light years removed from the kind of life she would eventually enter and write about, the genesis of the book happened during an expensive luncheon meeting with a magazine editor. As the conversation topic drifted, Ehrenreich casually wondered how people get by on the low wages of the â€Å"unskilled.† â€Å"Someone ought to do the old fashioned kind of journalism...go out there and try it for themselves,† she exhorted. She didn’t really have herself in mind, but her editor challenged her with a single word, â€Å"You.† The idea also came in the wake of sweeping welfare reform in 1996, which moved roughly four million women from the welfare rolls and into the workforce. The study Ehrenreich undertook then was to see how she could manage economically in the low wage work pool in which many such women found themselves. To prepare for the project, Ehrenreich set up some ground rules. When looking for work she would not fall back on the use of her usual skills as a writer, and she would take the highest paying job while at the same time seek the least expensive housing that still offered privacy and safety. Admittedly, she recognized the advantages she possessed -- good hea... ...ess, Ehrenreich’s book has received some criticism for its lack of policy suggestions. She does not offer concrete ideas on how to remedy this situation. Some also said she did not avail herself of the aide that is available. However, the reality is that those who need help aren’t magically endowed with the knowledge of how to receive it. In Barbara’s appeal for food assistance, it took initiative, seventy minutes of calling, driving, and nearly $3 spent in phone calls, which resulted in about $7 worth of food. In California, many of the working poor are made up of non-English speakers or those who are working here illegally. These people do not know where to start to get help or are not inclined to seek it for fear of reprisal. I found the book well written and very eye opening to the struggles faced by millions of women - and men - in the United States.

An Unknown Hero: an Essay on Theodore Dwight Weld

An Unknown Hero An Essay on Theodore Dwight Weld From 1830 through 1844, during the formative years of the American abolitionist movement, many arose as leaders in the fight for freedom. Author, editor, and auditor, Theodore Dwight Weld, was one of the leading framers of this movement. Many historians regard Weld as the most influential figure in the abolitionist movement. Despite his great works, Weld strove for anonymity in all his endeavors. This has long made him an unknown figure in American history.Weld, born in 1803 in Hartford, Connecticut, was the son and grandson of Congregational ministers. At the age of fourteen he began earning money to attend Phillips Academy. He continued his studies here until failing eyesight caused him to drop his courses in 1822. Following his attendance at Phillips Academy, Weld began a lecture series on mnemonics. He traveled for three years throughout the United States, including the South where he saw slavery firsthand. Weld’s family mov ed to upstate New York, where he studied at Hamilton College.Here Weld became a disciple of Charles Finney. Finney was best known as an innovative revivalist, an opponent of Old School Presbyterian theology, an advocate of Christian perfectionism, a pioneer in social reforms in favor of women and blacks, a religious writer, and president at Oberlin College. Weld was drawn to Finney's system for many reasons. It left no excuse for sin; it emphasizes present responsibility; it exalted the atonement of Christ; and it magnified the work of the Holy Spirit. Weld became a member of Finney’s â€Å"holy band† and worked under Finney for several years.When Weld decided to begin lecturing again, he became a preacher and entered the Oneida Manual Labor Institute in Oneida, New York. There, he would travel in two-week intervals about New York, lecturing on the virtues of manual labor, temperance, and moral reform. In 1831, philanthropists, Lewis and Arthur Tappan, hired Weld as th e general agent for the Society for Promoting Manual Labor in Literary Institutions. The Tappan brothers devoted their time and money to causes such as temperance, the abolition of slavery, and the establishment of theological seminaries.In Weld’s report to the Tappan's, he reveals that he â€Å"traveled 4,575 miles; 2,630 miles by boat and stagecoach; 1800 miles on horseback, 145 miles on foot. En route, he made 236 public addresses. † During his time as a manual labor agent, Weld helped establish and became a student at Lane Theological Seminary in Cincinnati in 1833. Pastor, Lyman Beecher moved his family to Cincinnati to become the first president of the Lane Seminary. The Seminary was founded during a time of rising social, political and religious conflict.Beecher was well known for his fiery sermons, yet attempted to contain his students’ social activism to maintain mainline support for the Seminary. His opposition of fellow revivalist Charles Finneyâ€⠄¢s views led him also to refuse demands made by a group of students led by Weld at the Seminary in 1834. Weld was an advocate of immediate emancipation, despite the fact that the Seminary had its own colonization society, which proposed to send slaves back to Africa. Weld convinced nearly every student of his beliefs over a period of months. This led to a debate that spanned across eighteen days over the appropriate solution to slavery.This debate addressed these two main questions: 1. â€Å"Ought the people of the Slaveholding States to abolish Slavery immediately? † 2. â€Å"Are the doctrines, tendencies, and measures of the American Colonization Society, and the influence of its principal supporters, such as render it worthy of the patronage of the Christian public? † Addressing the first question, the opponents of immediate emancipation argued that slaves were too incompetent to provide for themselves, leaving unlearned freed slaves without homes. This lack of edu cation would lead to a increase in violence and criminal activity.Immediate emancipation would be â€Å"unsafe to the [white] community†. Members of the American Anti-slavery Society refuted these arguments with the first hand testimony of, the newly emancipated, James Bradley. Bradley was stolen from Africa when as a baby, and sold into slavery to his master, who lived in Arkansas. When Bradley was eighteen years old, his master died, leaving Bradley to his master’s widow. For years, he managed the plantation for his mistress. All the while, Bradley was money to buy his freedom. After five years he paid his owners $655 to he received his â€Å"free papers†.He then emigrated to a free State with more than $200 in his pocket. Every bit of the $855 he earned by labor and trading. Once free, Bradley became well-respected member of the American Anti-slavery Society. Bradley ended his testimony by saying, â€Å"They [slaves] have to take care of, and support themsel ves now, and their master, and his family into the bargain; and this being so, it would be strange if they could not provide for themselves, when disencumbered from this load. † He said the two most prominent desires of the slaves were â€Å"liberty and education. â€Å"The debate resulted in a consensus to support abolitionism. The group also pledged to help the 1500 free blacks in Cincinnati. Consequently, the board of directory at Lane Theological Seminary banned further discussion of slavery. In rebellion, eighty percent of the students left the Seminary. Many of these enrolled at the new Oberlin Collegiate Institute. Some of Weld’s converts included such well-known abolitionists as James G. Birney, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Henry Ward Beecher. Theodore moved to New York to head the new American Anti-Slavery Society’s training session.Here he continued lecturing on the inhumanity of slavery to gain recruits into the Society. When he lost his voice in 1836, Weld became the appointed editor of all the Society’s books and pamphlets. He began working as the editor of The Emancipator in 1836. It was an abolitionist newspaper founded in 1819 by the son of a Quaker minister. Weld used pen names for the majority of his writings. This attribute has contributed to the degree of his popularity when pitted against many other notable 19th century civil rights advocates. Weld married Angelina Grimke in 1839.She and her sister, Sarah Grimke, were abolitionists and strong women’s rights advocates. In letters written to the Grimke sisters, Weld conveys his ideology on women’s rights. He wrote, â€Å"sex neither qualified nor disqualified for the discharge of any functions mental, moral or spiritual†¦ Woman in EVERY particular shares equally with man rights and responsibilities†. He furthered this by proposing that qualified women should have the right to choose their own spouse, and should be able to hold a place of a uthority in the court of law. Weld had been the first to suggest this â€Å"ultraism† of women’s rights, as he described it.Even many women had opposed the idea that a women had a right to courting a man of their choice. Such propositions had been unheard of up until these letters. Weld, with the help of his wife and her sister, wrote American Slavery As It Is: Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses in 1839. This pivotal book is regarded as the most influential work on the antislavery movement. It is composed of the testimonies of those who had witnessed the inhumane treatment of slaves. Many topics were addressed in this book, including: the housing of slaves, the treatment of the sick, the amount of labor, their food, and their clothing.On the subject of labor, a slaveholder by the name of Asa Stone testified, â€Å"Every body here knows overdriving to one of the most common occurrences. The planters do not deny it, except, perhaps, to northerners. † This and a tho usand other accounts on the treatment of slavery were compiled to create this book that would convert many to the abolitionist movement. Theodore wrote two other greatly influential works on the civil rights movement. The first was The Bible Against Slavery, written in 1837. This book compared the context of ancient Israel to the context of a 19th century America to denounce the practice of slavery.Through passages from the Bible, Weld argued the religion involved in the abolition movement. In 1838, Weld wrote the pamphlet, The Power of Congress over the District of Columbia. In this piece, Weld argued the political side of abolition, revealing Congress's power to abolish slavery in Washington, DC. Both of these works played an enormous role in recruiting followers for the abolitionist movement. Theodore Dwight Weld devoted his life to the American abolitionist movement. He remained dedicated until the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ended slavery in 1865.From his mentors, to his lectures and writings, to the woman he chose to marry, Weld’s passion for the equality of man can be seen in every facet of his life. This undying resolve is what has earned Weld the title of the most influential figure in the abolitionist movement. Works Cited Barnes, Gilbert H. The Antislavery Impulse: 1830-1844. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964. Print. Debate at the Lane Seminary, Cincinnati. Boston: Garrison ; Knapp, 1834. Print. The Dickinson College Archives. â€Å"Slavery & Abolition in the US. † Slavery ; Abolition in the US.Instructional and Media Services, July 2010. Web. 16 Nov. 2012. ;http://deila. dickinson. edu/slaveryandabolition/title/0182. html;. Johnson, Rossiter, ed. â€Å"Weld, Theodore Dwight. † Appletons' Cyclopedea of American Biography. 1st ed. New York: D. Appleton and, 1889. Print. Prince, Monique. â€Å"Theodore Dwight Weld, 1803-1895. † Documenting the American South. University of North Carolina, 2004. We b. 16 Nov. 2012. . Smikin, John. â€Å"Arthur Tappan. † Spartacus Educational. Spartacus Educational Publishers Ltd, n. d. Web. 16 Nov. 2012. lt;http://www. spartacus. schoolnet. co. uk/USAStappanA. htm>. â€Å"Theodore Dwight Weld (1803-1895). † WWHP. Worcester Women's History Project, 2010. Web. 16 Nov. 2012. ;http://www. wwhp. org/Resources/Biographies/theodoredwightweld. html;. Thomas, Benjamin P. Theodore Weld, Crusader for Freedom. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1950. Print. Tikkanen, Amy, ed. â€Å"Theodore Dwight Weld (Abolitionist). † Columbia Encyclopedia. Columbia: Columbia UP, 1935. Print. Vaughn, Stephen L. , ed. â€Å"The Emancipator. † Encyclopedia of American Journalism. N. p. : Routledge, 2009. 4. Print. Weld, Theodore D.American Slavery as It Is: Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses. New York: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1839. Print. Weld, Theodore D. , Angelina Grimke, and Sarah M. Grimke. Letters of Theodore Dwight Weld, Angelina Grimke We ld and Sarah Grimke, 1822-1844. New York: Da Capo, 1970. 425-32. Print. Weld, Theodore D. The Bible Against Slavery. New York: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1838. Print. Weld, Theodore D. The Power of Congress over the District of Columbia. New: John F. Trow Printer, 1838. 27. Print. Wright, G. F. Charles Grandison Finney. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and, 1891.Print. ——————————————– [ 1 ]. â€Å"Theodore Dwight Weld (1803-1895). † WWHP. Worcester Women's History Project, 2010. Web. 26 Nov. 2012. . [ 2 ]. Wright, G. F. Charles Grandison Finney. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and, 1891. Print. [ 3 ]. Smikin, John. â€Å"Arthur Tappan. † Spartacus Educational. Spartacus Educational Publishers Ltd, n. d. Web. 26 Nov. 2012. . [ 4 ]. ^Thomas, page 38 [ 5 ]. Debate at the Lane Seminary, Cincinnati. Boston: Garrison & Knapp, 1834. 3-4. Pamphlet. [ 6 ]. Vaughn, Stephen L. , ed. â €Å"The Emancipator. † Encyclopedia of American Journalism.N. p. : Routledge, 2009. 4. Print. [ 7 ]. Tikkanen, Amy, ed. â€Å"Theodore Dwight Weld (Abolitionist). † Columbia Encyclopedia. Columbia: Columbia UP, 1935. Print. [ 8 ]. Weld, Theodore D. , Angelina Grimke, and Sarah M. Grimke. Letters of Theodore Dwight Weld, Angelina Grimke Weld and Sarah Grimke, 1822-1844. New York: Da Capo, 1970. 425-32. Print. [ 9 ]. Prince, Monique. â€Å"Theodore Dwight Weld, 1803-1895. † Documenting the American South. University of North Carolina, 2004. Web. 16 Nov. 2012. . [ 10 ]. Weld, Theodore D. American Slavery as It Is: Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses.New York: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1839. Print. [ 11 ]. Weld, Theodore D. The Bible Against Slavery. New York: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1838. Print. [ 12 ]. The Dickinson College Archives. â€Å"Slavery & Abolition in the US. † Slavery & Abolition in the US. Instructional and Media Services, July 2010. Web. 26 Nov. 2012. . [ 13 ]. Weld, Theodore D. The Power of Congress over the District of Columbia. New: John F. Trow Printer, 1838. 27. Print. [ 14 ]. Barnes, Gilbert H. The Antislavery Impulse: 1830-1844. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964. Print.

8 smart things you need to do the night before your job interview

8 smart things you need to do the night before your job interview Pop quiz, hotshot: it’s the night before your big job interview. What should you be doing to get yourself ready? Know where you’re going.This is probably the most important thing you can do before your job interview. Nothing sends your brain into panic mode (and gets the interview off on the wrong foot) like feeling lost and worrying you’re going to be late. The night before, make sure you’ve got a planned route ready to go in Google Maps, or Waze, or whatever your favorite navigation app is. If you’re going to be using public transportation, check the schedules and look for notifications about planned changes, updated timetables, etc. If you’re driving, look for signs of construction or traffic delays. That way you can plan to leave earlier if necessary.Get your paperwork together.You should bring a copy of your resume, as well as any notes you want to bring with you. If they’re assembled the night before and placed with your bag or y our keys, you’re less likely to forget to bring something important.Assemble the interview outfit.If you have a go-to interview outfit that is clean, pressed, and ready to go, you’re ahead of the game. If you’re not sure yet what you’re going to wear- well, it’s a little late, but you’ve still got time. Take 15 minutes to review your suit or outfit and your shoes, and make sure that a) everything is clean, and b) there are no hanging threads or wrinkles.Rehearse your body language.If you have a trusted audience (a significant other, a family member, a friend), run through your best handshake-and-smile routine. Have the other person ask you a few test run questions, and ask the other person to note any posture or demeanor issues- bonus points if you get the person to engage in some generic small talk/banter to get you ready for that as well.Even if you don’t have a trusted audience, you can still prep- you’ve got a mirror, right ? You can practice your easy interview smile and your â€Å"ask me about my accomplishments† sitting posture. Believe it or not, just putting some thought into where you put your hands or how you cross your legs can help you feel more at ease the next day.Rehearse your talking points.Sure, the interviewer is going to have your resume in front of them, but neither of you wants you to just run verbatim through the document. Come up with specific, real-world examples for the points on your resume and be prepared to talk about them. You probably already did some practice questions, but take the time to review the points you really want to hit in the interview.Do a last sweep for information about the company.Visit the company’s website and social media profiles to see what’s going on at the company in real time. It can give you background information to use during your interview (â€Å"Ah yes, I saw that you just had an intriguing breakthrough in widget production last week!†). But it can also save you from making an awkward mistake (â€Å"Good thing your own CEO hasn’t been indicted for insider trading. What? Oh, I didn’t see that news last night.†)Set your alarm.I’m setting this as a separate to-do because it’s so important if you have a morning interview. You want to make sure you have time to get ready in the morning, without being late for the interview. So if you have to be up at a specific time to allow timely prep and travel, set your alarm. Set two alarms. (I believe in not messing around here, especially if you’re not a morning person.)Get plenty of sleep.I know, it’s a clichà ©, but it’s true. More sleep leads to better cognitive function, and you want to be at your very best. Sure, coffee can help, but not nearly as much as genuine rest. Go to bed as early as you can.And at every step of your night-before prep, don’t forget to be positive about the whole thing. You’ve got this, and every proactive thing you do the night before will make your interview even better.

Syphilis In Measure For Measure Essays - Syphilis, Free Essays

Syphilis In Measure For Measure Essays - Syphilis, Free Essays Syphilis In Measure For Measure Syphilis in Renaissance Europe and in Shakespeares Measure for Measure Bibliography to venereal disease appear as early in the second scene of Shakespeares Measure for Measure. Syphilis, the primary and most horrible of venereal diseases, ran rampant in Shakespeares time. By giving a brief history of the disease in Renaissance Europe one can gain a better understanding of the disease which will provide a greater insight into the play which would have gone unknown. This brief history will include, the severity of the disease in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe, believed origins and symptoms of the time period, and methods of curing or combating the disease.. By reading and analyzing passages referring to syphilis in Measure for Measure it is clear that Shakespeare himself believed in most of the truths established by the poet and physician Fracastor. Fracastor was the primary source and influence regarding studies of syphilis in Renaissance Europe. The disease we now commonly identify as syphilis is believed to have arrived in Europe for the first time in the late fifteenth century. Though there are few statistics from that period available to prove such an argument, there is plenty of evidence that supports that the disease suddenly emerged in great abundance during this time period. It is also believed that syphilis was much more severe then, than it has ever been since. Zinsser writes in his book, Rats, Lice, and History that: There is little doubt that when syphilis first appeared in epidemic form, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, it was a far more virulent, acute, and factual condition than it is now (Rosebury 23). The first time syphilis, called evil pocks at the time, was mentioned in print occurred on August 7, 1495 in the Edict of the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian. In this document syphilis was believed to be a punishment sent from God for blasphemy and was described as something which had never occurred before nor been heard of within the memory of man (Rosebury 24). Between the years 1495 and 1498 there were a total of nine similar documents that emerged through out Western Europe. In 1530 Fracastor, a poet and physician, published the poem, Syphilis sive Morbus Gallicus, translated Syphilis or the French Disease. The main character was a shepherd in Hispaniola named Syphilis. Syphilis caught the disease for disrespecting the Gods. At the time Fracastor believed in the previous documents, but would provide his own original ideas concerning how the disease reached Europe. He also alluded to possible treatments, that Shakespeare will later use in his plays. Fracastor used the name syphilis for both the main character and the disease he contracted. However, the name of the disease continued to be known as the French disease. It was not until the 1850s, more than three centuries after Fracastors poem, that the disease was called syphilis. Fracastors poem grew widely popular in Western Europe, and was believed to be mostly factual at the time. It might seem odd that a fictional poem with fictional characters would be widely regarded as truth, but under the extreme circumstances of the sixteenth century syphilis epidemic it makes perfect sense. Syphilis had caused terror in the hearts of the people in the sixteenth century due to its rapid spread. Physicians seemed helpless to cure it. No one could do anything, but believe in what Fracastor wrote. In the poem Fracastor had answers concerning its origin, symptoms, and cure for this new disease. He went along with the common belief that it appeared in the French army before Naples around the year 1495. From France, and justly took from France his name, (Rosebury 31). This quote provides the evidence concerning syphilis former name, The French Disease. He also discussed how he believed that it originated in America, and was brought back with Columbus and his men. This was the popular view of the day, and many researchers still find truth in it. What Fracastor truly believed, at the time, was that the positions of the planets influenced the outbreak of the disease. He believed that they lined up in such a way that provided great conditions for the emergence of the disease. In the poem Fracastor also

Analyze Tasty Burger from Boston though political lens Essay

Analyze Tasty Burger from Boston though political lens - Essay Example The owners are the founders and partners of the firm, and they are David Dubois, Maureen McLaughlin, Phil Audino, and Bryan Reyelt. These internal stakeholders are depicted in various ways in the interviews, from being passive aggressive to being in a way cool and helpful and encouraging when it comes to dealing with the employees. There is also the sense of the owners/partners being very hands on and involved with the daily operations. This can be because it is young chain and that there are only three branches at present. (Amber, 2013; Miller, 2013; Reyelt, 2013; Gotreau, 2013; Dan, 2013; Ed, 2013; Wash, 2013; Richard, 2013; Audino, 2013; Tasty Burger Holding, 2011). One key issue with the owners/partners is that there is evidence of them not being able to trust people outside of a core group. Insiders get the bonuses and the inside track on promotions and future plans, but outsiders are left in the dark, and are generally not treated as well. For instance, whereas Ed at Fenway was privy to expansion plans and received bonuses on an annual basis, Dan at Harvard Square did not even know that there is a bonus or rewards program in place for people at their level. The bar manager, meanwhile, was not even aware that there is an expansion plan being pushed, even though she was in charge of a group, bars and wines basically that spanned all of the Tasty Burger branches. This latter is evidence that the owners did not share plans with all, but only with those that they deem trustworthy enough. Looking at the interview with Phil Audino, meanwhile, one sees that the trust issue is at play when the group decided to make one of the partners, Brian, the director for Marketing. The reason cited here is that the use of an outsider didn’t cut it, because they needed someone who knew what it is like to run the business from the inside. The group’s bias towards an insider is very evident here, and conversely so too is the owners’ distrust generally of out siders. One can also say that key employees can be thought of as constituting the internal stakeholders at Tasty Burger. From the interviews, some of the employees who have been promoted and are being eyed to play larger roles during and after the expansion are part of the internal stakeholders too. The store manager at Southie, Amber, notes that in general the treatment of the managers and key people is generally fairly good, but that the treatment of the non-core personnel, the ordinary staff, can be awful. This tells us too that directionally, the thrust is to treat management personnel as key people who are to be part of the internal stakeholders of the company in the long term (Amber, 2013; Miller, 2013; Reyelt, 2013; Gotreau, 2013; Dan, 2013; Ed, 2013; Wash, 2013; Richard, 2013; Audino, 2013; Tasty Burger Holding, 2011; Tasty Burger Holding, n.d.). That said, strictly speaking ordinary staff are internal stakeholders too. It is not a surprise though that as can be gleaned from Amber’s comments, that they are considered as inessential or replaceable and not a part of the long-term plans of the organization. The curt replies in the interviews also further reinforce the notion that the ordinary staff have either low engagement with the company, as reflected in the focus on pay and working to get paid, or else that they are passive about their own future about the firm, taking into consideration that they have not been treated well

CASE ASSIGNMENT MODULE 5 Performance Management Essay

CASE ASSIGNMENT MODULE 5 Performance Management - Essay Example Performance of employees is clearly impacted by the performance management systems used within a company. These systems also help the human resources team to deal with various opportunities and also help in developing new career options and growth levels likewise. A well planned and implemented system can prove to be the success factor for the business (Armstrong and Baron). Performance management systems help in developing the competencies of the workforce as well as help in identifying the week areas of the employees. This can be used as a method to overcome the weaknesses of the employees and to develop them to become good in the particular area (Smither). Also the performance management systems help in continuous monitoring and help in better overall performance of the employees. Considering an China – US Joint venture, the main area that needs to be considered is the need for constant monitoring. Here the company needs to ensure that all employees are monitored constantly , to help gain the best results. Managing performance can be a result of many difference methods like training and development, mentoring, management of stress, competitive assessments and also ideas like performance appraisals (FSA). When there is a joint venture, it is important to ensure that the cultural differences are kept in mind while developing the performance management systems. The basis for a successful performance management system is effective communication of the goals and responsibilities both to the employees as well as to the managing individuals within the company. If the employees are clear about their role, and the part they play within a company, the contribution will be accordingly and will help in keeping up to the expected performance as well (Rollo). The second crucial stage here is the monitoring of the individuals and to ensure that the business performance is also well tracked and focused upon (Daniels and Daniels). Monitoring the business and the indivi duals within the company helps the managers and top management provide constructive feedback to the employees and also constantly requires the managers to reinstate the main goals and objectives of the company (Paladino). Here the management can lay down the expectations of the organisation effectively and provide the employees with a clear path of their duties. This is crucial especially in a multi cultural organisation as it helps in healthier working condition and better performance as a whole. Finally, it is crucial to implement a fair rewarding structure for the employees of China as well as the US organisations and here the actual performance of the employees needs to be considered while providing both monetary as well as non monetary benefits (FSA). The above mentioned points will benefit the overall implementation of the performance management systems and these will allow developing an effective system (Smither). Here in this case, since the joint venture is between two inte rnational firms, hence, there are a number of international considerations that also need to be addressed while developing and implementing the performance management systems (Daniels and Daniels). Of these, the first and foremost factor that needs consideration is the cultural differences. Here it is important to take this into account as people from different cultures work